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1 Introduction
Experimental work has established that individuals do not always behave op-
portunistically in order to maximize their monetary payoffs – the ultimatum
game, the one shot prisoner’s dilemma and public goods games are all cases in
point. This evidence has prompted several theories of ”social preferences”.1 Ex-
perimental subjects are however anonymous, while agents are rarely anonymous
in real life situations. A company manager, who is wondering whether to renege
on a deal that he has informally agreed to, knows that his opportunism will
be noted and possibly discussed, not only by his business partner, but also by
his own colleagues or employees. How do players behave in strategic situations
when their behavior is public, i.e. when it is observed by others, and affects
their reputation, in a broad sense? Is behavior motivated by the concerns that
seem relevant in anonymous experiments, or do different considerations become
dominant?
This paper takes a step towards an answer by analyzing strategic behavior
of players who make decisions in front of a large audience, on a show that was
broadcast on prime time television in the Netherlands.2 The critical decision is
made at the end of the show, in the final stage. Each of two players has to make
a decision whether to share (S) or grab (G) a sum of money, X. Each player
makes his/her decision independently without knowing the choice of the other
player. The monetary amounts earned, as a function of the row player’s own
decision and that of his opponent, are depicted in Fig. 1.
S G
S X2 0
G X 0
Fig. 1: Money Payoffs
That is, if both players share, they each get X2 ; if only one player shares, his
opponent gets the entire amount; and if both players choose to grab, they both
get zero. If players are concerned only with their own monetary payoffs, the
game in Fig. 1 corresponds to a generalized prisoner’s dilemma game, where
G corresponds to the ”defect” action.3 The amount available to share, X,
1A non-exhaustive list includes Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2001) and Charness and Rabin (2002).
2The economic analysis of behavior on game shows has mainly focused on strictly compet-
itive situations (e.g. Berk et. al. (1996) or Metrick (1995)) or on risk preferences (e.g. or
Gertner (1993) or Hartley et. al. (2005)). These shows provide little information on social
preferences. However, Levitt (2004) uses a competitive show (The weakest link) to study
discrimination. Oberholzer-Gee et. al. (2004) and List (2006) analyze behavior in the game
”Friend or Foe”, that is closely related to the game show we study.
3By a generalized prisoner’s dilemma, we mean a game where defect is a weakly dominant
strategy.
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depends upon the ”earnings” of the players, which depend upon their success
in answering trivia questions in an earlier stage in the game. The median value
of X is e 1,683, so that the stakes are substantial. While this final stage is
of interest in itself, the game has a richer structure — before they make their
decisions, the players can make speeches to each other, and this communication
is free format. There is also a selection stage to this game, where one player (the
lead player, who is most successful in answering trivia questions) must choose
one of the other players with whom to play the final stage.
This paper provides an analysis of the behavior of players in the rich and
complex extensive form game. Our substantial findings are that despite the large
stakes, players share about 40% of the time. The probability of sharing depends
significantly upon observable player characteristics – women are more likely to
share than men, and a player who has ”earned” a large share of the pot is less
likely to share. We also find that the content of communication is a reliable
predictor of the sharing decision – a player who makes an explicit voluntary
promise to share is very likely to honour that promise. On the other hand, if a
promise is not volunteered, but arises in response to an explicit question by the
presenter of the show, players are no more likely to cooperate than otherwise.
This sheds new light on the compulsions and constraints perceived by agents
when they engage in what is normally considered ”cheap talk”.
Our empirical analysis is guided by, and seeks to test, the theory of inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2001)). A key quan-
titative prediction we derive from the theory is the 50% rule – sharing can only
emerge in equilibrium if the probability of sharing by each player is at least 0.5.
This is true under the extremely weak assumption that individuals are weakly
self regarding in their inequity aversion – that is, the social component of prefer-
ences is such that an individual weakly prefers an asymmetric allocation where
she is better off, to its mirror image where her opponent is better off. Under
somewhat stronger but still very reasonable assumptions, the sharing probabil-
ity must be even larger, at least 23 . In our data, in only 7% of the episodes have
pairs of players a predicted probability of sharing above 0.5, and for all but
one pairs of players in our data, we can reject the hypothesis that the sharing
probability is greater than 2/3. This implies that inequity aversion does not
explain sharing as an equilibrium phenomenon. We suggest that reputational
considerations, arising from the publicness of the show, may be more important.
Our second surprising finding is that characteristics which reliably predict
a player’s sharing behavior do not affect the sharing probability of his or her
opponent. For example, although a woman is more likely to share than a man,
she is no more likely to benefit from her opponent’s sharing decision than a
man is. Furthermore, a player who promises to share – a promise that our data
2
shows to be quite credible – does not seem to induce sharing behavior by the
opponent. This second finding runs counter not merely to the predictions of the
theories of inequity aversion and reciprocity, but also to much of the experimen-
tal evidence, which shows that players reward niceness and punish nastiness by
their opponents. Here again we suggest that reputational considerations may
explain this result, since it is cheaper to acquire a reputation for niceness when
the opponent is less likely to share. Our overall conclusion is that some mixture
of motives – reputational concerns and inequity aversion – may best explain
these empirical results.
The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes
the game show and provides basic descriptive statistics on the participants and
their characteristics. Section 3 sets out the alternative theoretical frameworks
that guide our empirical work. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical results,
while the final section discusses the related literature and concludes.
2 Description of the game and data
The focus of our paper is on the critical decision made by the players, in the final
stage of the game, when they must choose whether to share or grab. However,
before this decision, the game also has two other important phases:
1. Selection Stage: The game starts with five players, who accumulate earn-
ings by answering trivia questions. At the end of each of three rounds,
one player is eliminated, the choice being made by the player who has
earned the most in that round. The third of these rounds is particularly
relevant: at the end of this round, the player with the highest earnings
(the lead player henceforth, who has earnings E1) has to choose one of the
two remaining players {2, 3} to play the final stage of the game. Players 2
and 3 have earnings E2 and E3 respectively, where players are indexed so
that E2 ≥ E3. If the lead player chooses player j, then he plays the final
stage of the game with this player, and the other player plays no further
part in the show. The total stake is given by X = E1 + Ej . The chosen
player can therefore either be the second or third player.
2. Communication Stage: the two players make speeches to each other in
sequence, the chosen player speaking first, and the lead player speaking
second. This communication is free format. Sometimes the chosen player
may respond to the lead player’s speech and in some episodes, the compere
of the show may ask one or both players if they will share. At the end
of the communication stage, the game moves to the final stage, where the
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Table 1: Individual characteristics of players
lead
player
chosen
player
eliminated
player
N obs. 69 69 69
Mean age 33.9 32.1 35.6
Share women 22% 52% 49%
share-grab decisions are made.4
We use data from all the 69 episodes of the show, which were aired in the
spring of 2002.5 The total prize at stake, X, varies between e 380 and e 26,600,
with a median value of e1,683. These are considerable sums given that the
median monthly income in the Netherlands is roughly e 1,200.6
Table 1 summarizes basic descriptive characteristics of the players reaching
the last selection stage7. The average player is 34 years old, with no significant
difference between ages according to player rank. Women constitute about one-
half of players 2 and 3, but only 22% of the first-ranked players, due to the fact
that they tend to answer fewer questions than men.8
In the final stage of the game, 43% of the players choose to share. Table 2
shows the distribution of joint decisions and median stakes. 19% of the episodes
end with a joint outcome ”S-S”, one-third with ”G-G” and 48% with ”S-G”.
Since 0.19 is almost exactly equal to 0.432(= 0.185), the decisions of the players
are clearly independent, a surprising finding in view of the fact that the game is
played in public and each player observes the other’s characteristics. We return
to this issue in greater detail later.
4Before these speeches, the players also declare their ”intention” to the TV audience.
That is, they simultaneously make ”intended choices”, from {S,G}. These intentions are non-
binding and are only observed by the TV audience, not by their opponent nor by the compere.
5Essentially the same game has been produced in the UK and in Australia, but we were
unable to obtain videotapes of these for analysis. The US game show, Friend or Foe, has an
identical final stage, but the overall extensive form is different and has been analyzed by List
(2004, 2006), Kalist (2005) and Oberholzer-Gee et. al. (2004). One criticism of TV show data
is that participants may not be a representative sample of the population. Our data suggests
that participants have a diverse background in terms of education and occupation, compared
to the pool of undergraduate students that are usually the subjects in laboratory experiments.
Thus the game show sample is possibly more representative of the overall population – see
Gertner (1993) and Harrison and List (2004) for a discussion.
6This is the median disposable income of a full-time employed person in 2000 (CBS, 2006).
7We have analyzed all the selection stages; however, since these are less critical we do not
report these findings in order to economize on space.
8Men answer on average 2.1 questions per series of 10 questions, while women answer 1.7.
The frequency of correct answers is roughly the same across gender (78% for men against 75%
for women). Answers translate into earnings in a way that depends upon how players choose
to ”invest”. Men also earn more because they invest more aggressively.
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Table 2: Distribution of outcomes and stakes
Outcome Frequency Median stake (e )
S,S 19% 3,090
G,S 48% 1,533
G,G 33% 1,850
Table 3: Individual characteristics and cooperation
Percentage sharing (%)
Overall 43
Male 36
Female 55
Final rank = 1 33
Final rank = 2 52
Young (age ≤ 34) 41
Old (age > 34) 44
Opponent shares 44
Opponent grabs 42
Prize [e 0, e 1,683[ 41
Prize [e 1,683, e 26,600] 44
Cooperative behavior seems to be related with a player’s demographic char-
acteristics and his/her performance in the game (see Table 3). Men are 20%
less likely to share than women. Lead players are also almost 20% less likely to
share than chosen players. Both statistics are highly correlated, since 78% of
the lead players are men. Finally, the cooperation rate is slightly higher when
stakes are larger (above the median value).
3 Theories of Social Preferences
We now consider how various types of non-pecuniary motivations can influence
behavior in the game form. The benchmark case is where agents are concerned
only with their own monetary payoffs. In this case, G is a weakly dominant
strategy, and the unique Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies
is (G,G). The game also has asymmetric Nash equilibria, where one player
plays S and his opponent plays G, but in these, the S-player plays a weakly
dominated strategy – if this player is even slightly uncertain about the other
player’s intentions (as seems likely in the context), she should play G. So if
players have only monetary incentives, the straightforward prediction is that
they will all choose to grab. Since this is clearly rejected by the data, we now
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consider models where players have non-pecuniary motivations.
3.1 Inequity Aversion
Individuals generally make positive contributions in public goods experiments,
which suggests that they are altruistic, i.e. they derive utility from the monetary
payoffs of others.9 On the other hand, responder behavior in the ultimatum
game suggests that they can be spiteful. Inequity aversion has been proposed
as a parsimonious explanation of these and other experiments.10 Bolton and
Ockenfels (2001) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose closely related versions
of this theory. A common feature is that a player is assumed to incur disutility
if payoffs are unequal. It is also assumed that the total payoff is additively
separable in the monetary and ”social payoff”, i.e. the disutility due to inequity
aversion.11 Let β˜i(X) be the disutility suffered by player i at the allocation
(X, 0), i.e. when i gets X and his opponent gets zero. Similarly, let α˜i(X) be
the disutility suffered at the allocation (0, X), i.e. when i gets zero and his
opponent gets X (see Figure 2). This is very similar to the model of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).
The intensity of inequity aversion is unlikely to be common knowledge. We
therefore assume that there is incomplete information about the preferences
of the players. To that purpose, we consider a Bayesian game where for each
player i, the vector (α˜i(X), β˜i(X)) has distribution F˜i(.) on some compact
support which is subset of the positive quadrant. That is, nature draws a payoff
realization for each player, where these draws are independent, and player i
observes his own payoff realization but not that of his opponent. The structure
of the game is common knowledge between the players.
Share (S) Grab (G)
Share (S) X2 −α˜i(X)
Grab (G) X − β˜i(X) 0
Fig.2 : Payoffs with inequity aversion
We say that inequity averse preferences are weakly self regarding if for any
type of player, α˜i(X) ≥ β˜i(X), i.e. the social component of preferences ranks
(X, 0) weakly above (0, X). This assumption, that inferiority aversion exceeds
superiority aversion, is widely adopted. Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman
9Ledyard (1995) provides an excellent summary.
10Levine (1998) proposes an alternative theory, where some individuals are altruistic and
others are spiteful; furthermore, the utility that individual i derives from j’s monetary payoff
also depends on whether j is altruistic or spiteful.
11One may allow for risk aversion towards money earnings but we follow the literature
and assume linearity for simplicity. In any case, this does not seem to modify the analysis
significantly. For example, the 50% rule we derive does not require risk neutrality.
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(1989) provide empirical support for this assumption. Our first result requires
only that preferences are weakly self regarding.
To obtain stronger results, we invoke additional assumptions, which are still
fairly weak. To reduce the payoff uncertainty to one-dimension, let us assume
that α˜i(X) = γβiX and β˜i(X) = βiX, where γ ≥ 1 is a fixed constant and βi
is a random variable. In this case, a player’s type is one-dimensional. Let βi be
distributed by a cdf Fi(.) with full support on [0, β¯]. Define βxi = β : Fi(β) = x.
So β0.5i denotes the median value of βi. Assume that β
0.5
i ≤ 1, so that the
median type weakly prefers the allocation (X, 0) to the allocation (0, 0). Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) make the much stronger assumption that βi < 1 for every
type of player.
Our first proposition makes quantitative predictions regarding the extent of
cooperation in any equilibrium with positive cooperation.
Proposition 1 If preferences are inequity averse and weakly self regarding, then
in any equilibrium where any player shares with positive probability, each player
must share with probability no less than 0.5. If additionally the types of players
are one-dimensional and the median type of any player weakly prefers the allo-
cation (X, 0) to (0, 0), then in any equilibrium with positive sharing, each player
must share with probability no less than 23 .
Proof. Let µ be the probability assigned by i to the event that j shares.
Suppose that i has no concern for money, and is only concerned about inequity
aversion. If α˜i(X) = β˜i(X), then i will be indifferent between S andG if µ = 0.5.
If i also assigns positive weight to his monetary payoff or α˜i(X) > β˜i(X), then
the required value of µ is strictly larger than 0.5.
We now turn to proving the second part. Although the relative incentive to
play S is not globally increasing in β, we shall show that in any equilibrium,
players must follow threshold strategies, whereby a player shares if and only if
βi exceeds a critical value. Define:
h(µ, β) = µβ − (1− µ)γβ − 0.5µ. (1)
That is, h(µ, β)X is the payoff difference between playing S and G for a
player with belief µ and payoff type β. Letting µ˜ = γ1+γ , it is easy to verify
that h(µ, β) < 0 ∀µ ≤ µ˜, so that in any equilibrium with positive sharing, the
probability of sharing must exceed µ˜. From equation (1) h(µ, β) is increasing in
β for µ > µ˜. This implies that if there exists a (µ∗, β∗) such that h(µ∗, β∗) = 0,
then h(µ∗, β) ≷ 0 as β ≷ β∗.
Fix an interior equilibrium (β∗1, β
∗
2), i.e. an equilibrium with positive sharing,
and let µ∗j = 1−F (β∗j ) be the equilibrium sharing probability of player j. Since
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β∗i is the type of player i that is indifferent between S and G, h(µ
∗
j , β
∗
i ) = 0,
which yields
µ∗j =
γ
(1 + γ)− 0.5/β∗i
. (2)
From the first part of the proposition, the indifferent type must be below
the median, i.e. β∗i ≤ β0.5i ≤ 1. Since γ ≥ 1, this implies µ∗j ≥ 23 .
Remark 2 The argument in the second part of the proposition iterates further.
Suppose that β1/3i ≤ 0.75 (and β0.5i ≤ 1). This implies that β∗i ≤ 0.75, implying
that µ∗j must be greater than 0.75. If we assume instead that β
1/3
i < 0.5 then
µ∗j > 1 in which case sharing cannot be supported in any equilibrium.
Note that β0.5i ≤ 1 allows a very high degree of inequity aversion, since half
the players could prefer the allocation (0, 0) to (X, 0). The lesson we draw from
this analysis is that with reasonable degrees of inequity aversion, cooperation
probabilities must be very high in order for cooperation to be sustained in
equilibrium.
It is worth noting that our 50-percent rule is perfectly general and applies to
any symmetric binary action game where the monetary payoffs have a prisoner’s
dilemma structure. This follows since the only assumptions invoked in the
proof are symmetry, and that inequity aversion is weakly self regarding. If
inequity aversion is to explain cooperation in such a game, then the probability
of cooperation must be at least 0.5 or even 2/3 if one is willing to make the
additional assumptions.
We have assumed in the analysis that the social preferences of a player are
defined over a pair of allocations, her own and that of her partner in the final
stage. It is conceivable that a player’s frame of reference is larger, and also
includes the allocation received by the eliminated players, i.e. those that do
not reach the final stage and who therefore get zero. Suppose that a player has
this larger frame of reference, and that his social component of preferences is
still weakly self-regarding, i.e. he prefers the allocation where he gets X and
everyone else gets 0 to allocation where his opponent getsX and he and the other
eliminated players get 0. The fifty-per cent rule is reinforced, and indeed the
required sharing probability of the opponent becomes even larger for a player to
be willing to share with positive probability. Since eliminated players receive an
allocation of 0 in this game, inequity aversion with respect to eliminated players
increases the attractiveness of the outcome (G,G) relative to the outcome (S, S),
since the former is more equal than the latter once eliminated players are taken
into account.
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Our empirical work shows that a player’s observable characteristics have sig-
nificant effects upon the player’s probability of sharing. For example, a woman
is more likely to share than a man. In a Bayesian equilibrium, these observable
characteristics will also affect the opponent’s sharing probability. In particular,
a change in player i’s characteristic that increases player i’s equilibrium sharing
probability will be associated with an increase in player j′s sharing probabil-
ity. The intuition is that with inequity averse preferences, there is strategic
complementarity in sharing decisions.
More formally, let us consider a Bayesian game where for each player i ∈
{1, 2}, this player’s inequity aversion parameter, β, has a distribution F (· |θi )
that is indexed by the player’s observable characteristic, θi. The indifference
condition for player i, equation (2), can now be re-written as:
µ∗j (θi, θj) =
γ
(1 + γ)− 0.5/β∗i (θi, θj)
. (3)
Consider now a change in player j’s observable characteristic to θ′j , such that
in the new equilibrium, player j has a greater probability of sharing. That is,
µ∗j (θi, θ
′
j) > µ
∗
j (θi, θj). From equation (3) it follows that β
∗
i (θi, θ
′
j) < β
∗
i (θi, θj).
Since θi has not changed, this implies that F (β∗i (θi, θ
′
j)) < F (β
∗
i (θi, θj)), so that
player i also shares with greater probability in the new equilibrium. We have
therefore proved the following proposition.12
Proposition 3 Suppose that a change in a player’s characteristic from θi to
θ′i increases the player’s equilibrium sharing probability. Then this change also
increases the player’s opponent’s equilibrium sharing probability.
We therefore have another testable implication of inequity aversion. Indeed,
it is a significant advantage of the game show set up, where players are not
anonymous, that one can specifically test for the effect of an opponent’s charac-
teristic upon a player’s sharing probability. This proposition also implies that
the sharing decisions of the players will be positively correlated. Note that the
prediction that players are nicer to those they expect to be nice is not unique
to inequity aversion, but is common to a range of different theories including
those by Rabin (1993) or Levine (1998).
Finally, note that the size of the stake X has no implications for the prob-
ability of sharing. This is of course a knife-edge result, and small changes in
12This proposition specifies the relation between two endogenous variables. Although this
is somewhat unusual, this is what is relevant for empirical analysis, since economic theory
does not specify what the role of characteristics (such as gender) should be. An example of
an induced increase in sharing probabilities associated with a change in characteristics from
θj to θ
′
j arises for instance if F (·


θ′j ) first order stochastically dominates F (· |θj ), and the
equilibrium is stable.
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modelling specification could give rise to either a small positive or small negative
effect. Note also that changes in X are likely to be associated with variation
in other characteristics, including the general knowledge and possibly the social
preferences of the participants.
3.2 Reputational considerations
A defining characteristic of a TV show is that, unlike many experimental games
where players are anonymous, the behavior of players is public. In such a
context, players may be concerned with how they are perceived by the audience,
and care about their reputation. Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) argue that such a
reputational concern can either be instrumental in nature (through its impact
on future interactions), or affective (through its consequences for social esteem
and shame).13
To model reputational concerns in a simple way, let us abstract from consid-
erations of inequity aversion, and let δi > 0 be the non-pecuniary cost associated
with playing G.14 The payoff matrix now becomes:
Share (S) Grab (G)
Share (S) X2 0
Grab (G) X − δi −δi
Fig. 3: Payoffs with Reputational Concerns
Reputational considerations promote sharing behavior even if a player per-
ceives that his opponent is unlikely to share. Indeed, since the payoff cost of S
is low when the opponent is less likely to play S, a player may be more willing
to play S. The cost of acquiring a reputation is low against an uncooperative
opponent. Notice now that (G,G) is not a Nash equilibrium. If the stigma cost
is sufficiently high for both players, i.e. if δi > 0.5X for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the
unique Nash equilibrium is (S, S). If δ1 < 0.5X, then (G,S) is a Nash equilib-
rium, and if δ2 < 0.5X as well, then both (G,S) and (S,G) are pure strategy
Nash equilibria. Most importantly, a concern for reputation does not impose
any requirement on the sharing probability in any equilibrium with positive
sharing – one can construct equilibria with arbitrarily low (or high) sharing
probabilities.
13Duffy and Feltovich (2005) provide an experimental treatment where one player’s action
in past interactions may be oberved by his current partner. The reputation that a player
seeks to develop depends on the specific game being played – e.g. it may be advantageous
to have a reputation for niceness if the game is the prisoners’ dilemma, but a reputation for
nastiness serves you better in the game of chicken. In our context, there is only a one shot
game, and players behavior therefore tells us something about the reputation that they seek
to develop in the game of life.
14A player may be keen not to look foolish, and may incur a different reputational cost if
he shares while his opponent grabs. We do not deny that this consideration may play a role;
however, this cannot explain sharing behavior, since it only reinforces grabbing.
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As with inequity aversion, one can analyze an incomplete information version
of the game with reputational concerns. Assume that player i’s reputation
parameter δ is drawn according to a continuous cdf Fˆ (·|θi) that depends upon
the player’s observable characteristic θi. Consider an equilibrium with a positive
probability of sharing. The indifference condition for the marginal type of player
i is given by
0.5µ∗j (θi, θj)X = δ
∗
i (θi, θj). (4)
Consider a change in player j’s observable characteristic from θj to θ′j , such
that in the new equilibrium j shares with greater probability. The above indif-
ference condition implies that δ∗i (θi, θ
′
j) > δ
∗
i (θi, θj), and this implies that player
i shares with lower probability in the new equilibrium. We therefore have the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that a change in a player’s characteristic from θi to
θ′i increases the player’s equilibrium sharing probability. Then this change de-
creases the player’s opponent’s equilibrium sharing probability.
Note also that the comparative statics of an increase in X is to reduce the
equilibrium sharing probabilities – this can be verified readily from equation (4)
– assuming that θ1, θ2 and the associated distributions are fixed, the only way
the pair of equations can hold for the two players is if the critical thresholds for
cooperation increase, thereby reducing the probability that each player shares.
As before, we have the caveat that variations in X are likely to be associated
with variation in other characteristics.
3.3 Communication
We now turn to the role of communication. In our game, we may assume that
a player always prefers the allocation (X, 0) to (0, 0). This implies that he
prefers that his opponent plays S, irrespective of what he himself intends to
play. The structure of the game is therefore similar to that to Aumann’s (1993)
stag hunt game, where a player strictly prefers that his opponent hunts the
stag, irrespective of the action that he intends to take. Aumann’s point is that
if talk is completely cheap – so that a player’s messages have no direct payoff
consequences for him – then one should expect communication to be completely
ineffective in such games. A player will send whatever message induces his
opponent to play S. Recognizing this, his opponent is unlikely to attach any
credence to the message, or any promise made.15
15Farrell and Rabin (1996) present an alternative point of view, arguing that cheap talk
may allow players to coordinate on efficient equilibria, even in the context of a stag hunt type
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The experimental literature suggests however, that subjects do not like to lie,
and suffer disutility from doing so (see for instance Gneezy (2005)). Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2004) formally model this in the context of a trust game,
where they assume that a player suffers a cost from lying.16 If we assume that
players suffer a cost if they promise to share but do not honour the promise,
then the game effectively becomes a signalling game. With inequity averse
preferences, one can show that communication can be effective, in the sense
that it increases the extent of cooperation that is possible in equilibrium. All
types of player promise to share, but only some of them honour the promise.
Since lying is costly, the set of types that share in equilibrium is larger than in
the absence of communication.17
On the other hand, if reputational considerations are important, then promises
do not increase the probability of sharing, since the structure of the game is
similar to the game of chicken. If a player i thinks that her opponent has repu-
tational concerns, it is not, prima facie, optimal for her to make a promise that
she will share. This is the case because such a promise may increase the oppo-
nent j’s incentives to grab, since the reputational cost of playing G is constant,
but the payoff gain from grabbing is increasing in the probability that i shares.
Indeed, in this case, a player may want to announce that she will play G . We
do not observe players making such an announcement, possibly for two reasons.
First, if there is only a disutility from breaking a promise but no disutility from
failing to carry out a threat, such an announcement may not be credible. More
importantly, if a player announces that she will play G, this may reduce the
reputational sanction on the other player. If i announces that she will play G,
it becomes common knowledge, to her partner j and to the audience, that i is
not a nice person, and is very unlikely to share. In this case, the reputational
cost to j from playing G may become small.18
4 Empirical analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis. First, we explore the relation between
observable player characteristics and sharing, via a bivariate probit analysis.
This leads us to consider the question of selection bias, possibly induced by
game.
16Miettinen (2006) extends the analysis to general normal form games, and characterizes
equilibrium outcomes with lying costs.
17The details of this construction are available from the authors.
18This discussion suggests a more sophisticated model of reputation than the simple one set
out earlier, where the reputational cost from grabbing, δj , is an increasing function of µ
p
i , the
public belief that player i will share. If the public belief is that player i is very likely to share,
but j nevertheless chooses to grab, then the reputational sanction suffered by j will be large.
An announcement by i that she will grab reduces µpi and therefore the reputational cost.
12
the lead player’s choice of a partner. We then test the 50% rule, and the role
of promises. Our results also allow us to calculate the ”gender-premium”, i.e.
the value of having a woman as an opponent in the final stage. We also draw
on an experiment we ran, in which we examine whether subjects who watch
DVDs of the TV show can predict player trustworthiness, in order to examine
the robustness of our results and interpretations.
4.1 Cooperative characteristics
We estimate a bivariate probit model, where the dependent variables are the de-
cisions of each final player. Table 4 reports the marginal effects of demographic
characteristics on the individual’s probability of sharing. While age does not
have any significant effect, the gender effect is substantial.19 A robust finding is
that women are almost 20% more likely to share, confirming the simple cross-
correlation presented in the previous section. We also find that players are more
likely to share when the stakes are high. An increase in the size of the prize
by e1,000 raises the probability of sharing by 4%. Note that the effect is only
significant at the 10%-significance level though.
What are the effects of the players’ relative contributions to the final pot
upon sharing probabilities? We would expect that a player who contributes more
to the pot is less likely to share, since she may feel entitled to a larger share of
the pie, and this is confirmed – an increase of the relative contribution by 10
percentage points reduces the probability of sharing by 7.7%, when evaluated
at the mean. This is consistent with the findings of Cherry et. al. (2002) in
the context of a dictator game – a dictator who has contributed more to the
pot is significantly less likely to allocate substantial amounts to the recipient.
Interestingly, we find that this extends a strategic setting of a simultaneous move
game, where things might have been expected to be less clear cut.20 A player
who has contributed less might rationally expect her opponent to be more likely
to grab, and could possibly be induced to grab. We find no evidence of this
here. Even when allowing for a non-linear effect of contributions by introducing
dummies for contributions below 30%, between 30 and 70% and above 70%, we
find a negative correlation between contributions and the probability of sharing
(see Table 4, col. (2)).
19We experimented with the age variable in different ways to test whether the effect was
non-linear but could not find any supporting evidence.
20We find no evidence that inequality of contributions perse affects the probability of shar-
ing.
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Table 4: Player Characteristics & the Probability of Sharing
Bivariate probit estimates - Marginal effects
(1) (2) (3)
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Female .16 (.09)* .19 (.09)** .19 (.10)**
Prize (x e1000) .04 (.02)** .03 (.02)* .03 (.02)*
Contribution (%) -.54 (.20)***
Contribution 30-70% -.28 (.12)** -.27 (.12)**
Contribution 30-70% & chosen -.27 (.12)**
Contribution 70-100% -.36 (.11)*** -.36 (.11)***
H0 : Joint effect own
characteristics = 0 (p-value)
.00 .00 .00
Rho (standard error) 14 (15) .14 (.15) .14 (.15)
N. observations 138 138 138
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
4.1.1 Testing for a selection bias
An important feature of our show is that the lead player can choose his op-
ponent in the final. This potentially biases our estimates – arguably, the lead
player tries to select the person who seems most cooperative, possibly by using
private signals of trustworthiness that are not captured by public characteris-
tics. If this is the case, the chosen player is more likely to be cooperative than
a randomly selected player, giving biased estimates. Lead players, on the other
hand, secure their position in the final round by answering questions and in-
vesting wisely, rather than being chosen based on cooperative signals. Since we
found no correlation between the performance in the game (measured by the
number of questions answered and the average investment) and cooperation,
there does not seem to be any reason why lead players should be less or more
cooperative on average.
This asymmetry in how lead and chosen players reach the final round could
possibly explain why those who contributed relatively little are more likely to
cooperate – by definition, a lead player contributes more than 50%, while a
chosen player contributes less than 50%. To check this possibility, we compare
the behavior of selected and lead players who contributed between 30 and 70%,
excluding the contribution variable (Table 4, col. (3)). We find no significant
difference in behavior, so that the contribution effect is unlikely to be driven by
unobservable characteristics.
The selection bias may also affect other results, in particular the coefficients
on public characteristics such as gender. If the lead player associates a public
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characteristic with cooperativeness, he will require a better private signal from
those who do not have that characteristic than from those who do, in order to
select them to play the final round. For example, if the lead player believes
that women are more likely to share than men, men will only be selected if
their private signal more than compensates the gender effect (ceteris paribus).
In that case, the difference in cooperativeness between men and women playing
the final round will be smaller within the sample of chosen players than in the
population.
We present a series of tests to investigate the presence of the potential selec-
tion bias in the sample. First, to get more insight into the selection decision, we
estimate an equation for the lead player’s choice, where the dependent variable
is a dummy that equals one when the second player is chosen (see Table 5).
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that lead players do not discriminate in favour
of women. This indicates that the estimated coefficient for the gender effect
on sharing is not biased. Lead players do discriminate against older players, as
these are less likely to be chosen. If that is true, older players must have sent a
better private signal to the lead player in order to reach the final round, and the
age effect could consequently be biased upwards. Note that money and relative
contributions seem to be what matters most in the selection decision. Those
who bring most to the final pot are more likely to be chosen.
Table 5: Probability of being chosen by lead player (Probit estimates)
P (chosen = 1|rank = 2)
2nd male - 3rd female .01 (.13)
2nd female - 3rd male .06 (.11)
Age 2nd - age 3rd -.01 (.00)*
Score 2nd - score 3rd (x e 1000) -.16 (.08)**
Contribution 2nd - contribution 3rd (%) .88 (.43)**
Pseudo R2 .19
N obs 69
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
A second test we propose is to compare the effects of gender and age between
lead and chosen players (Table 6). If there is a selection bias, the age and gender
effects will differ systematically between lead and selected players. We find no
significant difference according to gender or age. The gender effect is larger
in magnitude for lead players, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Also, the age effect is not significantly different from 0, for both lead and selected
players.
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Table 6: Difference between Lead and Chosen Players in Sharing Behavior
Bivariate probit estimates - Marginal effects
Age .00 (.01)
Age X chosen player .00 (.00)
Female .28 (.15)**
Female and chosen -.18 (.19)
Contribution (%) -.57 (.31)*
Prize (x e1000) .03 (.02)*
H0 : Joint effect own characteristics = 0 (p-value) .00
Rho (standard error) .14 (.15)
N. observations 138
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
Our third test is to see how the gender and age of the excluded player affect
the sharing probability of the chosen player. If a player i is chosen above a
player with a favorable public characteristic, then the value of i’s private signal
must be larger than in the case where i is selected in preference to a player who
does not have favorable public characteristics. We find that the characteristics
of the excluded player have no significant effect on the sharing decision of the
chosen player (Table 7).
Finally, we ran an experiment where we asked our subjects to predict the
sharing probabilities of all three players, including the eliminated player. Pre-
sumably, the private signals observed by lead players could also be noted by our
subjects who were shown videotapes of the TV show. If this is the case, and
if lead players do indeed observe useful private signals, we would expect cho-
sen players to be predicted as being more cooperative than eliminated players,
controlling for observed characteristics. However, we found that there were no
significant differences between the predictions for the two types of player.
Overall, our tests find no evidence of a selection bias for gender, age or con-
tributions. Lead players do not consistently select in order to have a cooperative
partner. Indeed, it seems that lead players more or less follow a social norm
of choosing the second ranked player – they do so 75% of the time. They do
not seem to be very strategic in selecting their partner, and in view of this, the
selection biases mentioned above may not exist or not be very important.
4.2 Opponent’s characteristics and cooperation
Table 8 investigates how the characteristics of a player’s opponent influences
the decision to share. Somewhat surprisingly, one cannot reject the hypothesis
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Table 7: Prob. that chosen player shares & characteristics of eliminated player
Bivariate probit estimates - Marginal effects
Age .01 (.01)
Age X eliminated player .00 (.01)
Female .15 (.13)
Female eliminated player .07 (.13)
Contribution 30-70% -.33 (.13)***
Prize (x e1000) .04 (.04)
N. observations 69
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
Table 8: Opponent’s characteristics and Prob. of sharing
Bivariate probit estimates - Marginal effects
(1) (2)
Opponent female -.12 (.10) -.14 (.09)
Both female .15 (.40)
Opponent’s age .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Opponent lead player -.11 (.13) -.11 (.13)
Contribution (%) -.78 (.34)** -.78 (.34)**
Prize (x e1,000) .04 (.02)** .04 (.02)**
H0 : Joint effect opponent characteristics = 0 (p-value) .38 .49
Rho (standard error) .12 (.20) .12 (.20)
N obs 138 138
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
that none of the opponent’s characteristics matter for a player’s decision. Since
there is no correlation between the decisions to share of the two players, this
implies that characteristics that we do not observe but that are observable to the
opponent are not driving sharing behavior. This negative finding is inconsistent
with a model where cooperation is solely driven by inequity aversion. In that
case, a player who is, say, matched against a woman should be more likely to
share. The data indicate that there is no evidence for this.
4.3 Testing the 50% Rule
We are now in a position to test a critical implication of inequity aversion set
out in proposition 1 – in any equilibrium where sharing occurs with positive
probability, each player shares with probability greater than 0.5. Furthermore,
if we assume that β0.5i ≤ 1, then the sharing probability must be greater than
2/3 for both players. The simplest test of 50% rule is as follows. Suppose that
a player predicts correctly the aggregate probability of sharing, and uses this
in order to estimate the sharing probability of her specific opponent, without
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Table 9: Predicted probabilities of sharing
Characteristics Mean 90% confidence interval Prob(p̂ ≥ 0.5)
All .43 [.40,.46] .00
Women .55 [.51,.60] .99
Men .36 [.33,.39] .00
Lead player .34 [.30,.37] .00
Chosen player .53 [.48,.56] .87
conditioning on her opponent’s characteristics. The relevant null hypothesis
is a one-tailed test where the true aggregate probability, p, is weakly greater
than 0.5. This null is easily rejected – our point estimate of p is 0.43, and the
probability that this value arises under the null is 0.
This simple test is subject to a caveat. It is possible that players do not
play the cooperative equilibrium, with positive sharing, all the time, but only
in some fraction of the episodes. Suppose players condition their behavior on
some commonly observed signal (a sunspot), and play the cooperative equilib-
rium (with positive sharing) for some realizations of the sunspot, but play the
bad equilibrium (where both players play G with probability one) otherwise.
That is, play corresponds to a correlated equilibrium of the Bayesian game.
This could conceivably lead to positive sharing, but with an aggregate sharing
probability which is less than 0.5. However, this explanation for low sharing im-
plies that sharing behavior should be correlated; in particular, the probability
that a player’s opponent shares, conditional on the player sharing, should be
greater than 0.5. However, we find that this conditional probability is 0.4 in the
data, and the null hypothesis that this is greater than 0.5 is easily rejected at
the 1 percent level of significance.
To explore the hypothesis further, at the level of each pair of players in our
data, we use the results in Table 4 (column (1)) to predict the probabilities of
sharing for each player in the final (p̂). We find that there are only 5 episodes
where both players had a predicted probability of sharing higher than 0.5. We
report the mean predicted probabilities in Table 9 and split the results according
to observable characteristics such as gender and relative position (lead vs chosen
player). We can reject that the probability of sharing is equal or larger than
0.5 for men and for lead players. Only women who are not lead players have a
predicted probability of sharing well above 0.5. Overall we can reject that the
probability that both final players share with a probability equal or larger than
0.5 in 64 out of 69 episodes. Furthermore, there is only one a pair such that
both players have a predicted probability of sharing greater than 2/3.
18
4.4 The Role of Promises
Before the candidates make their final decision in the last round, they get the
opportunity to make a brief speech. The chosen player speaks first, and the
lead player speaks after this. This speech is ”cheap talk” in the sense that any
promises made are not binding and do not affect monetary payoffs. Players
may say anything they please, and there is a diversity of ways in which players
use this opportunity. Some players make a promise to share, while others do
not – they sometimes talk about what they intend to do with the money; try
to convince the other player to share, or say in general terms that ”sharing is
good”. We code the communication into a dummy variable which equals 1 if
the player makes an explicit promise to share.21 We count 45 explicit promises
in our sample (out of 138 messages).
Table 10 presents the results of bivariate estimates including a dummy for
promises. We find a strong correlation between promises and cooperative be-
havior: Those who promise to share are almost 50% more likely to indeed do
so. Those who will grab seem on the other hand reluctant to lie. This is in
line with the experimental evidence (Ellingsen and Johannsen, 2004; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006; Orbell et al., 1990) and suggests that making a promise
is not cheap talk, since a lie may be psychologically costly for a player. Our
results are also contrary to the findings of Gneezy (2005), who suggests that
players are sensitive to the consequences of the lie upon their opponent. That
is, player i is disinclined lie, when by doing so the opponent j is induced to take
an action that has adverse monetary consequences for j. The peculiarity of our
game is that a lie has no monetary payoff consequences for the opponent. If a
player intends to play G, then her opponent’s monetary payoff does not depend
on his action – he gets zero irrespective of his action. Nevertheless, we find that
players are reluctant to lie.
Our definition of a promise is one that is made voluntarily. In some episodes
a player does not volunteer a promise, but is induced to make a promise because
the compere asks them explicitly, at the end of their speech, if he/she intends to
share. Out of 20 such instances, only one player did not explicitly answer ”yes”,
and we label these yes responses as ”forced” promises. We include dummies
both for forced and voluntary promises in column (2) of table 10. While the
effect of voluntary promises remains large and significant, we do not find any
significant effect of forced promises and we can reject the hypothesis that the two
coefficients are equal. We indeed find no correlation between a forced promise
and observable cooperative characteristics. We conclude that forced promises
21Typical promises take the form: ”I will share”, ”I promise to share” or ”I will not let
you down”. The key criteria we use is that the statement includes the word ”I”, and a clear
statement of the intention to share.
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do not affect behavior, while voluntary promises are an excellent predictor of
sharing behavior.22
Since a voluntary promise is a strong predictor of the player’s behavior,
we can see whether a promise influences behavior of the opponent. If players
interpret promises correctly, and have inequity averse or conditionally coopera-
tive preferences, an opponent’s promise should increase a player’s propensity to
share. However, we find that the opponent’s promise has no effect on a player’s
sharing decision – see column (3) in table 10. This is in line with the general
finding that the decision to share is not influenced by opponent characteristics or
even their choices. It also implies that either players do not interpret promises
appropriately, or that conditionally cooperative preferences or inequity aversion
do not play a major role. Finally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that promises
are independent, even though players speak sequentially.
Our results raise an interesting question: why does a player who intends to
choose S not make a promise to do so? Suppose that player i believes that his
opponent is inequity averse; furthermore, i knows that j is aware that making
a false promise is costly, at least for some types of player i. Then if i intends to
play S, it is always optimal for him to make a promise, since this increases the
probability that j shares. However, we find that 36% of the players who choose
S do not make a promise. It seems unlikely that a player is uncertain of his own
action at the communication stage – such an explanation would presume that
a player resolves his uncertainty upon hearing his opponent’s speech. Indeed,
we find that of the lead players who play S, 39% do not make a promise – since
lead players speak last, this explanation is very unlikely to apply to them. One
explanation is that some players are unaware of the role of promises – i.e. they
may not realize that making a promise is a costly signal of future intentions.23
An alternative explanation for both these anomalous findings is that reputa-
tional considerations are more important in sustaining sharing. Recall that with
reputational concerns, the relative payoff gain from sharing is decreasing in the
probability that the opponent shares. The prevalence of reputational considera-
tions, and players’ recognition that their opponents may have such preferences,
may provide one explanation for our results. At this point, it is worth noting
that almost no player ever threatens to play G— as we have argued in section 3,
such a threat may well reduce the reputational sanction on a player’s opponent
when she plays G, by changing the public belief about the player.
22In an interview, we asked the compere the reasons for asking this explicit question. He
responded that this was dictated mainly by a consideration of how much time was left for
the program. We find no correlation between the compere’s question and the observable
characteristics of players in the sample of players who not make a voluntary promise.
23This suggests that a refinement of the model of costly communication in section 3, where
a sender or a received may be unaware of the existence of the message s, may be relevant. We
leave this for future research.
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Table 10: Promises and cooperative behavior
Marginal probability of sharing: P(share=1) - Bivariate probit estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Voluntary promise .48 (.08)*** .48 (.08)*** .48 (.08)***
Forced promise -.02 (.15) -.02 (.15)
Voluntary promise opponent .08 (.10)
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Female .19 (.09)** .19 (.09)** .20 (.09)**
Contribution (%) -.81 (.33)** -.81 (.32)** -.84 (.33)**
Prize (x e 1,000) .04 (.01)*** .04 (.01)*** .04 (.01)***
Chosen player -.11 (.15) -.11 (.14) -.12 (.15)
Rho .05 (.21) .05 (.21) -.02 (.24)
N obs 138 138 138
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
Finally, we should note that if players get disutility from lying, this changes
the payoffs in the game, and may modify the predictions of proposition 1. For
example, a player who has promised to share may now be induced to play S even
if the probability of his opponent sharing is less than 0.5. This of course raises
the question, why does such a player make a promise in the first place, if he does
believe that his opponent only shares with low probability. Nevertheless, to test
for robustness, we restrict attention to the sub-sample where neither player has
made a promise to share. Here again we find that the probability of sharing is
less than 0.5, supporting our earlier results.24
Lies and liars
Although a large fraction of players hold their promise, we also have some
liars — indeed, 41% of the people who make a promise to share do not abide
by it. Lying can only pay if it convinces the opponent to share, i.e. if the
opponent is a conditional cooperator25. Indeed, a player who intends to grab
could increase his own monetary payoff if the opponent believes the lie and
decides to share. The higher the stakes, the higher the monetary payoff from
lying. Table 11 reports probit estimates of the probability of lying (defined
as an individual who makes a voluntary promise to share but chooses G) as a
function of characteristics of the players. We find no clear relationship between
the size of the stakes and the probability of lying. Thus, it does seem that liars
do not only care about their own monetary payoff. On the other hand, we find
24If we use the results of table 10 to predict the probability of sharing (including promises),
we still find that in only 9 out of 69 episodes both players had a predicted probability of
sharing higher than 0.5.
25Our results in the previous section show that promises do not affect the behaviour of
the opponent, so lying seems totally useless. The fact that players lie suggests that they are
unaware of this and believe that they can influence the decision of their opponent.
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Table 11: Marginal probability of lying: P(lying = 1)
Bivariate probit estimates
Age .00 (.00)
Female -.05 (.07)
Contribution (%) .46 (.21)**
Prize (x e 1,000) -.01 (.01)
Chosen player .10 (.10)
Rho .18 (.26)
N obs 138
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level
that those who contributed relatively more to the final pot are more likely to
lie, perhaps because they feel less guilty about it. The ”liars” have no further
distinct characteristics – gender, age or ethnicity are not correlated with lying.
4.5 The value of a woman
From the previous sections, we know how lead players select their opponents
and what the determinants of cooperative behavior really are. Combining these
results gives insights into the money that is lost by not selecting the most
cooperative player. We have shown that the main determinant of the lead
player’s decision is the monetary contribution that each player would make to
the final pot. Those who would contribute more are more likely to be chosen.
Most importantly, the lead player does not discriminate in favour of women.
We use our estimates of column 1 in Table 4 to predict the respective prob-
abilities of sharing of the second and third players, P̂j , j = {2, 3}. We find that
the third player has a higher predicted probability of sharing than the second
player in 35 episodes (half of the sample), with on average a 19% higher likeli-
hood to share. We calculated the expected value of each player, Vj (j = {2, 3}),
where Vj is equal to P̂jXj ,and Xj is the final stake if player j plays the final.26
We find that on average the second player is worth e 338 more than the third
player. However, there are 23 cases where the third player has a higher expected
value than the second player, yet the the third player is effectively chosen in 11
of them only.
Turning to gender, table 4 shows that women are 16% more likely to share
than men. There are 38 episodes where a man and a woman compete for the
position in the final round. On average, a woman is worth e 519 more than her
male competitor and she has a higher expected value in 37 of these 38 episodes.
26This is the expected payoff of choosing player j if the lead player plays G in the final
stage, and twice the expected payoff if he/she plays S.
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Table 12: Gender mix, optimal and actual choice
Gender mix V2 − V3 Modal optimal choice Frequency optimal choice
Woman second,
Man third
e 775
(N = 22) Woman
17
22
Man second
Woman third
− e 168
(N = 16) Woman
3
16
Woman second
Woman third
e 470
(N = 16) Second
13
16
Man second
Man third
e 97
(N = 15) Second
10
15
However, women are chosen in 20 of these 37 episodes only. In only 3 of these
episodes is she the third-ranked player.
Table 12 reports the average difference in expected values between the sec-
ond and third player, as a function of their gender. The average difference in
expected values is e 775 when the female player is in a second position. Women
who are in a second position are on average more likely to share than men in a
third position, i.e. the gender effect more than compensates the effect of relative
contributions.
As a rule of thumb, in order to maximize expected earnings the lead player
should always select the female player, and take the highest ranked one if the
choice is between two players of the same gender. Table 12 shows that in around
40% of the episodes the player chosen is not the one with the highest expected
value. The choice seems mostly based on the ranking of the players, i.e. the
lead player chooses the second player in 75% of the cases. One possibility is
that lead players simply choose the second ranked player very often, since this
is the ”fair” thing to do.
4.6 Can observers predict player behavior? An experi-
ment
One possible explanation for why we do not find that a player’s characteristics
affect the sharing probability of his or her opponent, is that players do not
correctly interpret how their opponents’ characteristics influence the probability
of sharing. To explore this, we ran an experiment in which subjects were shown
recordings of the game show and asked to predict the choices of the players. Our
goal was to examine how accurately subjects interpret observable characteristics.
We refer to a companion paper (Belot et. al., 2006) for a detailed exposition
and analysis of the results of this experiment.
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The results reveal that predictions are very noisy and that, on average, sub-
jects are not very good at predicting. Nevertheless, we do find that students
accurately interpret some basic characteristics. Firstly, subjects predict an ag-
gregate sharing probability of 42% which is very close to what we obtain in our
sample. This supports our analysis of the 50% rule, since it shows that the av-
erage subject is not significantly over-optimistic about human sharing behavior
as compared to the reality of the game show. Second, subjects correctly believe
that women are more likely to share than men (although they underestimate
the magnitude of the difference), and that the player who contributed most is
less likely to share. On the other hand, their predictions are correlated with
characteristics that are not associated with cooperativeness in the original data.
For example, subjects expect older players to be more likely to share, while we
find no strong relationship between age and cooperative behavior in our data.
Overall, the results of this experiment provides some support for the equilibrium
analysis conducted in this paper since it shows that subjects expectations are
not out of line with the reality of actual behavior.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper speaks to a number of literatures, including empirical work on the
prisoner’s dilemma, on the nature of social preferences, on pre-play communi-
cation and on gender differences in kindness or altruism. Space considerations
do not permit an exhaustive discussion of all these literatures, and we will focus
on what seems most directly pertinent.
The prisoner’s dilemma is probably the most famous of games, and has been
the subject of innumerable experiments. Our analysis has focused on deriving
and testing sharp quantitative and qualitative predictions of an influential the-
ory – the theory of inequity aversion – in the context of this prisoner’s dilemma
game played on public television. These predictions also apply to any general-
ized prisoner’s dilemma with symmetric monetary payoffs.
The US TV game show ”Friend or Foe” has a similar structure to our game,
with monetary payoffs as in Table 1. The overall extensive form is somewhat
different since pairs of players play as a team to accumulate prize money. Thus
the ”earnings” phase is more cooperative than in our game, and could possibly
induce greater sharing. List (2004, 2006) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2004)
analyze this data and find an overall sharing rate of 0.5, with cooperation drop-
ping between the first and second seasons of the show. This cooperation rate is
not inconsistent with the 50% rule derived in proposition 1. However, it does
seem prima facie inconsistent with the minimum probability of 23 derived under
stronger assumptions. Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2004) find weak evidence that
24
sharing is correlated with some demographic characteristics, although they fail
to find a gender effect. Our paper differs from this work in two respects. First,
given the richer extensive form, we are able to provide empirical analysis of
players’ communication and the lead player’s selection decision.27 Second, we
have tested behavior against the clear quantitative and qualitative predictions
of inequity aversion and other alternatives.
The literature on experimental prisoner’s dilemma games is enormous – Sally
(1995) provides a survey and a meta-analysis. Focusing on symmetric binary
action prisoner’s dilemma games where there are no serious concerns about rep-
etition effects,28 the cooperation rate in experiments is quite low, often in the
range of 20 to 30 percent (see for instance Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Andreoni
and Varian, 1999; and Cooper et al., 1996). These low rates of cooperation
cannot be explained by inequity aversion, and suggest that even in a labora-
tory environment, other considerations are important. The cooperation rate
is typically higher in experiments where subjects are not anonymous and/or
can communicate (Dawes et al., 1977; Orbell et al., 1990; Ledyard, 1995; Sally,
1995, Bohnet and Frey, 1999), and indeed often well above the 50% threshold.29
In comparison with prisoner’s dilemma experiments with communication, our
cooperation rate is relatively low. Since this occurs despite the publicness of
the environment, it suggests that the enormity of the stakes is playing a role in
inducing grabbing behavior.
From a theoretical standpoint, our main finding is that inequity aversion
cannot explain cooperative behavior. Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engel-
mann and Strobel (2004) present experimental evidence from dictator and other
games of distribution, showing that inequity aversion alone is inadequate to ex-
plain behavior. In the two-player context, these papers suggest that players are
also motivated by efficiency considerations. Such a concern for efficiency could
also be important in our context.
One puzzling finding is that we find many good predictors of a player’s
sharing decision – gender, relative contribution, and voluntary promises are
27”Friend or Foe” does have a selection stage right at the beginning, when individuals
form teams. List (2006) shows that the selection of partners at the beginning of the show
is driven by characteristics correlated with expected payoff. However, the expected payoff
from a partner depends on expected earnings from answering questions as a team as well the
partner’s probability of sharing. The advantage of our setting is that when the lead player
makes her selection decision, she observes each potential partner’s realized earnings, so that
uncertainty only pertains to the partner’s sharing decision.
28Most laboratory experiments have some element of what subjects could construe as rep-
etition, despite careful design. One advantage of our TV show is that subjects know for sure
that it is a one shot game.
29The extent of cooperation depends on whether communication is written or face-to face,
one-sided or two-sided (e.g. Cooper et al., 1989, 1992; Crawford, 1998). Holt (1995) claims
that communication is ineffective when the incentives to defect are high.
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all extremely informative. Nevertheless, these do not influence the opponent’s
decision in any way. This appears to be counter to the predictions of much
of the experimental literature which shows that people want to be nice to the
nice, and nasty to the nasty. There is a very wide range of literature establishing
this phenomenon, including public goods experiments and the ultimatum game.
Indeed, Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2001) and Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) are all papers which develop theories that are motivated by this
literature. We have suggested that a combination of reputational concerns and
inequity aversion could explain this puzzle, but this deserves further exploration.
There is substantial experimental evidence showing that pre-play commu-
nication permits a higher level of cooperation or trust. Ellingsen and Johan-
nesson (2004) study an experimental version of the hold-up problem with one-
sided communication. In one treatment the non-investing party is allowed to
make a promise, while in another treatment the investing party may make a
threat. They find that pre-play communication improves efficiency when the
non-investing party is allowed to communicate. Subjects are reluctant to lie,
but promises are more credible than threats. Gneezy (2005) presents experi-
mental evidence showing that the cost to a player from telling a lie depends
upon the consequences upon the opponent – a lie that imposes smaller costs
upon the opponent when believed is more palatable. As we have seen, in our
game it can plausibly argued that lying itself imposes no monetary cost upon the
opponent; nevertheless, players are reluctant to lie, and voluntary promises are
surprisingly informative. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) study a trust game,
and find that pre-play communication is informative and effective. They set out
a somewhat more complex model, that is inspired by the theory of psychological
games. Duffy and Feltovich (2005) provide an experimental comparison of the
effectiveness of communication as compared to observation of past actions in
one-shot games.
Our findings also relate to the literature on gender differences in altruism and
reciprocity. There does not seem to be a consensus on whether or not women are
more altruistic than men – Eckel and Grossman (1999) provide a review of this
literature. Croson and Buchan (1999) analyze trust games and find that women
exhibit greater reciprocity, while the degree of trust exhibited does not differ
according to gender. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that women are more
altruistic than men when altruism is expensive, while men are more inclined
to be generous when generosity is cheap. This is consistent with our results,
since sharing behavior is expensive in our high stakes context. Additionally,
the publicness of the context may play an important role in generating gender
differences in behavior that maybe absent in anonymous experiments.
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To conclude, we examine behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma type game played
in a public setting with high stakes. We suggest that a mixture of motives,
inequity aversion plus reputation, may best explain our results. Our findings
suggest that behavior in a public setting may thus be motivated by different
concerns from behavior in experiments, and that this difference may be eco-
nomically relevant and worth exploring further.
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